Trump’s Syria Doctrine… & a Possible Sudan Edition?

Trump’s Syria Doctrine as a template: What it could mean for Sudan?

According to the White House, President Trump has outlined the following demands for Syrian President (Jolani) Ahmed al-Sharaa:

1. Join the Abraham Accords and normalise ties with Israel.
2. Expel all foreign terror groups from Syrian territory.
3. Remove Palestinian terrorists from the country.
4. Assist the U.S. in blocking any ISIS resurgence.
5. Take control of ISIS detention centres in northeastern Syria.

If this doctrine is a precedent, particularly under a U.S.-Gulf-Israeli axis, then we can ask: what would a Trump-era doctrine for Sudan look like?

A hypothetical Trump Doctrine for Sudan (though not currently viable under the KSA-SAF arrangement) becomes plausible under a UAE-RSF broker, due to shifting alignments and realpolitik calculations. It might look like this:

1. Normalise ties with Israel.
2. Crack down on Iranian proxies & logistical channels within Sudan’s borders (and via Libya/Red Sea).
3. Dismantle Islamist and Muslim Brotherhood networks, especially those embedded in state institutions.
4. Provide full counterterrorism and military cooperation for U.S. and allies, especially along the Red Sea and Sahel corridor.
5. Monopolise the state’s use of force by dismantling all RSF-style paramilitary structures and restoring full territorial integrity under central command.

Now, here’s the paradox:

Burhan, ironically, was the one most aligned with these demands during Sudan’s transitional period. He made quiet moves toward Israel, purged Islamist figures (along with the transitional govt of Hamdok), coordinated CT efforts, and upheld a centralised command structure. But now?

For Burhan to even attempt these demands today would be a death wish at this current time.

Burhan’s capacity to manoeuvre was dramatically eroded by the outbreak of war and the collapse of the transitional compact. His credibility, both internal and external, took a heavy blow.

And yet, recent SAF territorial gains & a wave of organic national support have repositioned him, not as a redeemed figure, but as the only remaining one with a coherent claim to national authority. His past, and that of the SAF, remains a heavy burden, but the battlefield has made him the default representative of state continuity.

The U.S. Dilemma: The Trump Optic

The U.S. must recognise that SAF’s resurrection should not be exploited under the assumption that it will comply with every demand, especially when the UAE, the RSF’s chief backer, is undermining regional stability. The recent covert attacks on Port Sudan, cloaked as decoy drone strikes, expose this contradiction.

If Trump’s brand of peacemaking is to mean anything beyond optics, then backing RSF-aligned destabilisation directly undermines that ambition.

The U.S. could instead honour SAF’s survival through the KSA broker track, a more conservative, less volatile partner (from what we have all observed from this war so far). But that comes with a crucial caveat: Burhan and SAF must resist point 1: Normalisation with Israel, at this time. Israel too must resist any geo-strategic ambitions involving Sudan.

Not out of ideological rigidity, but out of moral clarity.

To normalise with an entity actively engaging in mass civilian slaughter would be a betrayal of the very people Burhan now claims to represent (though, truthfully, he has done so before, see: involvement in Darfur genocide with the Janjaweed & Abraham Accords with Israel in 2020 without-then government approval). Sudan has lost enough. There is no need to befriend those who revel in inflicting loss.

The RSF, by contrast, cannot make a claim to national legitimacy. Its value lies in its chaotic utility, a force that thrives in grey zones and transactional relationships, making it attractive to actors like the UAE and, increasingly, Israel, who may see points 1, 2, and 3 as easier to extract from a pliable (former paramilitary) now militia rather than a formal national army. Its acts of ethnic cleaning and genocide along with nationwide rapes and looting to only name a few, are acts no Sudanese civilian within Sudan would sensibly turn to for authority or legitimacy.

Trump’s Priorities in This Lens:

• Optics.
• Pro-Israel posture.
• Anti-Iran containment.
• Tactical stability for U.S. and Gulf security corridors.

In that equation, Burhan fits, but only if he can still play the role of “cooperative strongman.” But his context has evolved past that simplicity.

Here’s where it gets interesting:

• Israel’s calculus? SAF isn’t reliable, RSF is more malleable on points 1, 2, and 3.
• Trump’s or MBS’s calculus? They might still see Burhan as the “known quantity”, the conservative military gatekeeper who could at least guarantee 4 and 5: regional stability and CT cooperation.

That’s the contradiction at the heart of this:

Israel may prefer RSF pragmatism; MBS and Trump may prefer SAF conservatism. And the U.S. wants both but on its own terms.

But who knows, possibly Trump’s ego may overwhelm such dynamics and bring both KSA & UAE to the table on Sudan to make himself & the regional backers look good for his personal and political machinations.

Conclusion:

What we’re witnessing isn’t a question of alignment, it’s a question of who can still perform the role the world needs to believe exists.

Burhan, once the transitional military partner to the West, was cornered by a war that shattered both his internal credibility and external utility. Albeit, that equation has started to shift. Through significant SAF gains and a wave of unprecedented popular support, he has increasingly come to embody the only semblance of a unified national force, or at least the strongest claim to it. But the road ahead remains steep, weighed down by the legacy of the SAF itself, past complicities, and his own track record.

The RSF, meanwhile, offers no such claim, only a model of chaos leveraged into political currency. Its appeal lies not in legitimacy, but in its utility: a force whose brutality, flexibility, and transactional nature appeal to actors like the UAE, and possibly Israel, precisely because it exists outside any conventional framework of accountability or sovereignty.

If Trump’s Syria doctrine signals a precedent, hardline, interest-driven, optics-first, then the key question for Sudan becomes: who can actually deliver on such a framework in practice?

Burhan may face obstacles, but he now stands as the closest figure to a unified command and a national project, however fragile.

The RSF cannot pretend to be more than a violent abstraction of fragmentation.

And yet, both may still be floated as “viable” to different audiences, depending on what is being sold: security, containment, or illusion.

In the end, a Trump-style Sudan Doctrine may not be about peace, sovereignty, or even long-term vision. It may simply be about maintaining the appearance that someone is still in control, enough to protect regional interests, secure Red Sea corridors, and keep the flames from licking at the edges of Riyadh, Tel Aviv, and Washington.

That appearance may be all that’s left. And someone will be chosen to wear it…whether it fits or not.